第二次衰退
本文见《财经》杂志2009年第8期 出版日期2009年04月13日
[size=+0][size=+0]
2010年,泡沫破灭的速度会超过政府制造泡沫的速度,资产价格很有可能再次下跌
2009年初,我曾撰文指出,全球经济将在今年下半年企稳,并在二季度开始出现熊市反弹。我当时认为,滞胀将是未来几年全球经济的主要特点。现在,我仍然坚持这样的观点。不过,熊市反弹来得比我预期的要早。原因是主要国家的政府已经为投机实施补贴,它们相信,主要的问题是流动性短缺和信心丧失。因此,如果投资者和投机客被拉回“游乐场”,世界经济就将回到良性循环中。但是,我认为,这些举措将导致全球经济在2010年出现第二次衰退。
2009年初,我曾撰文指出,全球经济将在今年下半年企稳,并在二季度开始出现熊市反弹。我当时认为,滞胀将是未来几年全球经济的主要特点。现在,我仍然坚持这样的观点。不过,熊市反弹来得比我预期的要早。原因是主要国家的政府已经为投机实施补贴,它们相信,主要的问题是流动性短缺和信心丧失。因此,如果投资者和投机客被拉回“游乐场”,世界经济就将回到良性循环中。但是,我认为,这些举措将导致全球经济在2010年出现第二次衰退。
政府托市“三部曲”
补贴风险确实会推高资产价格,这里,资产主要是指股票。但是,股价上升可以带动经济复苏的美梦是不会成真的。我们目前处于债务泡沫破灭之中。上升的资产价格是通过鼓励借钱去投资和消费来提振经济的。由于目前债务的水平已经很高,人们不会再增加债务去投资和消费。当经济快速复苏的美梦被雨打风吹去,股价也将再次下挫。这将暴露出金融体系更多的问题,并引发全球经济第二次下跌。
政策制定者对他们的刺激计划仍不起作用感到沮丧。美国政府和美联储已经花了或者承诺了12万亿美元,来挽救美国的金融体系。2009年,美国的财政预算赤字是1.75万亿美元,但是,实际赤字很可能超过2万亿美元。欧洲中央银行、英国中央银行和日本中央银行都已经把利率降到历史低位。它们的政府也已经捅下了很高的财政赤字。但是,全球的就业、企业家信心和消费者信心都在持续恶化。主要经济体很可能在2009年一季度遭遇了类似2008年四季度那样的收缩。对于2009年全年而言,欧元区、英国和美国将收缩4%-5%,德国和日本则可能收缩7%-8%。
这种全球性经济衰退是前所未有的。更重要的是,人们很难看到衰退结束之后,世界经济将如何增长。如果历史重演,在眼下如此严重的经济衰退之后,政治危机可能爆发。
当经济危机引发政治危机,经济快速复苏将会化为泡影。由于陷入绝望,各国政府将试图直接提振资产价格,或者通过刺激观望的投机者重新加入游戏的方式来提振资产价格。由于对政府的行为不明就里,多数人可能认为经济正在趋稳,或者将会立刻反转。毕竟,股价不是经济“晴雨表”吗?有这种想法的人,通常会追涨杀跌。这就是熊市反弹,它将吞没很多精明的投资者。
美国政府试图提振资产价格,是从美联储宣布购买数万亿美元的国债、商业票据和按揭债券开始的。它试图通过盯住按揭利率来稳定资产价格。但是,实行这种政策表明,美联储其实知道房价应该如何走。相对于收入,美国的房价明显被大大高估了。在泡沫破灭之后,房价应该下调了。美联储这么做,就是为了放缓调整的步伐,并且通过制造普遍的通胀而不是听凭房价下跌,来转移调整的阵痛。美联储现在的政策,将会在未来数年里影响美元的走势。
美国政府试图提振资产价格的第二步是“盖特纳计划”,它试图剥离美国问题银行的“有毒资产”。实际上,这项计划就是通过补贴投机而提振“有毒资产”的价格。按照这一“美丽计划”,对“有毒资产”的需求应该会迅速增长。不过,到目前为止,这类资产的价格还没有大幅增长。
为什么?我认为,市场不相信“盖特纳计划”会奏效。因为这项计划是用纳税人的钱补贴投机客。如果这项计划继续推进,美国国会可能通过立法,收回参加这项计划的投资者获得的利润,将之充公。由于担心后果,投机客也不敢接盖特纳递过来的钱。
美国政府试图提振资产价格的第三步,是改变美国财务会计准则委员制定的按市值计价的原则。现在,美国金融机构得到许可,如果它们认为市场失灵,可以不以市值对其资产计价,而是根据其“判断”。也许市场未必能对资产完美定价,但是,谁能做得更好呢?改变按市值计价的原则,就等于允许问题银行不再对坏资产计提损失。这样一来,问题银行的股价就会大幅上升。
不过,银行不破产,难道不是件好事吗?未必。看看日本的例子吧。它的银行本质上没有公布损失,并试图造出资金来重组。日本经济因此失落了十年,没有成功地从资本短缺中解脱出来。仅仅更改会计准则,不会改变银行资本紧缺的事实。这些银行知道它们没有充足的资本,因此,它们不会增加信贷,并试图从现存资产中挤出利润,从而可以重组资本。这会拖延经济复苏。看起来,美国正在复制日本模式。
除了美国制定政策以提振资产价格,大多数主要经济体都在鼓励它们的银行增加信贷。
“鼓励”是什么意思?在正常情况下,银行借贷是在平衡风险和收益之后,争取利润最大化。政府鼓励它们放贷,实际上就是向它们施压,降低信贷标准,承担更多风险,却获得同样或者更少的回报。这种政策,实际上是用未来的坏账换取今天的需求。支持这种措施的论调是,如果每家银行都借钱,经济改善,就会减少坏账发生。但是,这种“免费午餐”式的想法,只会通过制造另一个泡沫而收一时之效,却会在未来引发更大的危机。
再次吹大资产泡沫,是全世界苦苦挣扎的投资者翘首以盼的。政策制定者在关注经济走弱和政治稳定之余,正在回应投资者的求救呼喊。这也是我们看到很多出台的政策,纷纷向瘪下去的泡沫充气的原因。现在,这种充气似乎取得了效果,但这种效果长不了。
我认为,2010年,泡沫破灭的速度会超过政府制造泡沫的速度。资产价格很有可能再次下跌。通胀可能会成为一个问题,它将导致国债和其他政府债券价格下挫。政府债券是最后破灭的泡沫。当这个泡沫遭到挤压,其他的资产价格将会见底。这将使目前政府充入泡沫中的空气释放出来。届时,全球经济会第二次下挫。
通胀还是通缩?
关于通胀还是通缩的争论一直很激烈。较低的债券收益率表示,投资者普遍认为目前存在通缩。2006年9月,在国际货币基金组织(IMF)和世界银行新加坡年会上,我预测2007年出现金融危机,2008年出现经济危机,此后会出现滞胀。虽然滞胀的预测还没有应验,但是,各国政府和中央银行正在执行的政策,坚定了我的想法——滞胀会困扰全球经济很多年。
从历史经验来看,投资泡沫破灭之后出现通缩有两个原因。第一个原因是投机泡沫是过度投资造成的。因此,在泡沫产生过程中,会出现产能过剩,因为在泡沫中,需求被夸大了。第二个原因是银行破产和企业减产会增加失业,从而减少需求,并导致更多的企业破产。这种恶性循环,延长了价格向下调整的时间。
有两个原因,使得目前的泡沫破灭后,不会出现持续的通缩。第一个是投机集中在非生产性的资产,例如,房地产和金融产品。
汽车和电子行业是两大全球产能过剩的行业。汽车行业产能过剩已经很久了。不过,这个问题却被信贷泡沫虚增需求所掩盖,因为购买者受到零首付零利率的刺激,频繁换购新车。但是,通缩的压力将随着一两个主要的生产商破产而结束。如果政府用纳税人的钱支持它们的汽车公司,通缩就会持续。不过,奥巴马政府目前不愿意这么做。
电子行业习惯于通缩了。通常,好的通缩会支持产量增加,产品价格下降。但是,现在的通缩不是好的通缩。全球企业资本支出的大幅削减,已经使IT 产品的需求暴跌,从而使得电子行业迅速调整。在没有政府施压的情况下,这个行业正在自行收缩,这个过程将随着产能削减而很快结束。
中国制造业扩张也是产能过剩的来源。十年前,当亚洲金融危机爆发,需求减少,我认为,中国的产能过剩会起到抑制通胀的作用。因为其他国家的厂商会跟随中国厂商的价格。现在情况不同了。制造业的价格是由中国制定的。相对于原材料成本,中国制造业的附加值已经大幅缩水,其庞大的制造能力不可能维持通缩。例如,钢铁行业四分之三的成本是铁矿石和焦煤这样的原材料。钢铁行业的产能过剩,不可能支持钢铁产品的价格下跌。
其次,破产(特别是银行业的破产)与需求减少之间的恶性循环现在也不同了。事实上,各国政府和央行正在救援世界上的每一家银行。它们给企业贷款,使其保持运营。目前的情形预示着全球经济将会很快触底。不过,全球经济还会在2010年第二次下跌。
虽然需求目前较弱,但是,大宗商品价格上扬、工会要求提薪会导致通胀再次降临,正如20世纪70年代的情形。
大宗商品价格上扬的趋势已经明显,这是因为投资者害怕货币供给过度扩张,想要寻找安全港。尽管需求减少,原油价格又重新站在每桶50美元的点位,表明太多的钱流向了交易所交易基金(ETF),后者购买了原油。鉴于央行在不停地发行纸币,越来越多的资金将流向大宗商品。
我一直相信,工会主要是靠需求驱动的。在繁荣时期,工会力量偏弱,因为经济繁荣提高了每个人的生活水平。当艰难时期到来,更多的人开始支持工会活动。在经济停滞期,特别是滞胀期,如果没有工会力量的干预,每个工人都会发现自己的生活水平在下降。法国和其他欧洲国家发生的全国性大罢工就是先兆。
除了2010年经济第二次下挫和未来出现滞胀,我还想评论一下熊市反弹的特征。在一个持续多年的熊市里,股市时常出现较大反弹。这些反弹的幅度,可能从底部上涨40%。显然,这样的熊市反弹令人垂涎。投资者很难做到只观望、不入市。
我不是反对在熊市反弹中挣钱。但是,必须记住,熊市反弹是零和游戏,甚至还是负和游戏。在每一次反弹后,市场可能会跌得更狠。一个人的利润其实是另一个人的损失。在熊市反弹中投资,把握时机是最重要的。早进早出是最基本的原则。最有害的是追涨杀跌。当市场反弹了30%,就不要追涨杀跌了,这对你的金融资产健康非常不利。
最近一次结构性熊市反弹发生在20世纪70年代,并持续了十年。投资者能在这十年来只观望不投资实在太难。毕竟,人的一生能有几个十年?这也就是为什么结构性熊市反弹会吞没越来越多的人。后跳进去的人是更有耐心和更精明的人。最后赔钱的投资者IQ可能超过200。我想,可能要到沃伦-巴菲特也开始赔钱,这场熊市才会结束。
Double dipping in 2010
Andy Xie
April 11, 2009
At the beginning of 2009, I wrote that the global economy would stabilize in the second half and a bear market rally could start in the second quarter of 2009. I thought that stagflation would be the dominant characteristic for the next few years. I am still sticking to the story. The bear market rally began earlier than I expected. The reason was that major governments have been introducing subsidies for speculation. They believe that the main problems are liquidity and confidence. Hence, if investors or speculators are brought back in the game, the world economy could be back to a virtuous cycle again. I think that this type of approach would lead to a second dip in 2010
Subsidizing risk taking does inflate asset prices, mainly stocks for now. However, the hope that rising stock prices will lead to economic revival will not be fulfilled. We are in the middle of a debt bubble bursting. Rising asset prices lift economy through boosting borrowing for investment and consumption. As the current levels of indebtedness are already too high, we won’t see rising debt demand for consumption or investment. When the dream of a quick economic recovery is dashed, stock prices will slump again, which could expose more problems in the financial system and trigger a second dip in the global economy.
The world is amidst a burst after a speculative boom. Boom-burst cycle is quite frequent in history (see ‘Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises’ by Charles Kindleburger). A synchronized global one is rare. The last one comparable to the current one was the boom-burst of 1920s and 30s. A synchronized global cycle requires trade and cross-border capital flow to be large. A synchronized global burst is difficult to overcome, because devaluation and export promotion no longer work. If one country has a burst, it can devalue, boost exports, and make money from foreigners to reflate its financial system. East Asia came back this way from its banking crisis ten years ago.
Policymakers are frustrated that their stimuli are not working so far. The US government and the Federal Reserve have spent or committed $12 trillion to bail out its financial system. Its budgeted fiscal deficit for 2009 is $1.75 trillion (12% 0f GDP) but will probably surpass $2 trillion. ECB, Bank of England, and Bank of Japan have all cut interest rates to historical lows. Their governments are already running high fiscal deficits. But, employment, business confidence, and consumer confidence continue to deteriorate around the world. Major economies probably suffered similar contraction in the first quarter of 2009 as in the last quarter of 2008. For the whole year of 2009, euro zone, the UK, and the US may contract by 4-5%. Germany and Japan could contract by 7-8%.
This sort of global economic collapse is unprecedented. Moreover, it is difficult to see how the world would grow again when the collapse is over. If history is guidance, political crisis tends to follow such an economic collapse. When an economic crisis triggers a political one, it makes a quick economic recovery virtually impossible. Out of desperation, governments are trying to support asset prices either directly or incentivizing reluctant speculators to play. Without understanding what governments are doing, most people think that things are either getting better or well soon. After all, shouldn’t stock prices tell us about the future, according to theory (Unfortunately not true in practice when you really need it)? The positive thinking is leading many to chase this market. This is a bear rally that will swallow many smart investors.
This phase of government policy-targeting asset prices began with the Fed’s announcement for buying up to $1.15 trillion of treasuries, commercial and mortgage papers. It was targeting mortgage interest rate in order to stabilize property price. However, this sort of policy meant that the Fed knew what property price should be. The US property price was 100% overvalued relative to income. After the bubble burst, it should go back. What the Fed is doing is to slow the adjustment and shift a big chunk of the adjustment through general inflation rather than property price decline. What the Fed is doing will impact the dollar for years to come.
The second part came with the Geithner plan for stripping toxic assets from the US’s troubled banks. Hank Paulson, Tim Geithner’s predecessor, wanted to focus on stripping the bad assets off the banks too. His plan didn’t fly because the market prices for the bad assets were too low for the banks to survive. Most banks have questionable assets more than twice their equity capital. As these assets are trading at 30 cents on the dollar, if the toxic assets are sold at market price, most banks are bankrupt. This is why Hank Paulson shifted to injecting money directly into the banks first. The hope was that it would stabilize the financial system and the toxic asset prices would rise sufficiently for the banks to survive. This hasn’t happened.
The Geithner Plan tries to boost the prices of toxic assets by subsidizing speculation. The centerpiece of the plan was offering government-guaranteed 6-1 leverage. If an investor risks one dollar, the plan caps his loss at one 1 but offers the reward equivalent to risking 7. The current toxic asset price is 30 cents on the dollar. The price reflects the expected return on the bad asset. It is equivalent to 70% chance of bankruptcy and total wipeout for creditors and 30% chance of survival for the borrowers that support the assets. Under the Geithner Plan, an investor that puts down one dollar can buy $7 worth of toxic assets. At the current price of 30 cents on the dollar, he could buy $23.3 of toxic assets. There is 30% chance that the investor gets $23.3 and, after paying off $6 of debt, and has $16.3 in income. There is 70% that he loses everything. Hence, his expected income for his $1 investment is $16.3*0.3=$4.9.
This plan should have boosted demand for toxic assets tremendously. Indeed, based on the simple example above, investors should be willing to pay more than twice the current price. This would save the banks. For the investors in toxic assets, they reap rewards from the 30% of the performing asset bundles that they have bought and leave the 70% non performing ones to the taxpayers. This ‘beautiful plan’ works by robbing taxpayers. But, the prices for toxic assets have not risen that much. Why? I think that the market doesn’t think that the plan could work. The public opinions may torpedo it before it goes into implementation. If it goes ahead, the US Congress may pass retroactive laws to confiscate the profits from the investors who participate in this scheme. Essentially, the Geithner Plan is giving speculators free money. But they are not taking it because they are terrified of the consequences.
The third piece is changing the mark-to-market rule. The Financial Accounting Standards Board of the US has changed its rule for accounting asset value. It now allows financial institutions to value their assets according to their ‘judgment’ rather than market price if they think that the market isn’t working. Market may not value asset prices perfectly. But, who could do better? This rule change is to allow the banks in trouble to stop reporting losses from asset quality deterioration.
When this change happened, the share prices of the troubled banks rose sharply. The market was not just reacting to a superficial change. The change is meaningful for the share prices. If the banks can name their prices for the assets on their books, they don’t have to raise capital to stay in business. This means that they might make enough money over time to recapitalize. Hence, the risk of their bankruptcy has declined. The increased survival chance has boosted their share prices.
Shouldn’t this be a good thing that banks don’t go burst? Not necessarily so. Look at what happened in Japan. Its banks essentially didn’t report their losses and tried to make money to recapitalize. It kept the economy down for ten years without succeeding in their getting out of capital shortfall. The reality won’t change with a change in the accounting rule. These banks know they don’t have enough capital. Hence, they won’t increase lending and will try to milk their existing assets for profits to recapitalize. They will be a drag on the economy for years to come. The US seems to be copying from Japan.
In addition to the US’s policies for targeting asset prices, most other major economies are encouraging their banks to lend. What does ‘encouraging’ mean? Banks normally lend to maximize profits by balancing between risk and reward. When governments encourage them to lend, it really means pressuring banks to lower standards, i.e., taking on more risk for the same or less reward. This sort of policy is really to exchange non-performing loans in future for boosting demand today. The argument in favor such an approach is that, if every bank lends, the economy improves, which would decrease non-performing assets. This sort of ‘free lunch’ thinking works temporarily by inflating another bubble. Of course, it will create a bigger mess in future.
Reflating an asset bubble to support the economy is widely hoped for by distressed investors around the world. Policymakers, in addition to their concerns for economic weakness and political stability, are responding to investors’ cry for help. This is why we are seeing so many policies that are pumping air into a deflating bubble. It seems the air-pumping is working now. But, it won’t last. As governments throw everything at it, more air is going in than coming out. But, government actions can’t put in air on a sustainable basis. The air leakage will last with rising unemployment, falling corporate profits, and collapsing trade.
I think that the air leakage will overwhelm government air pumping in 2010. Another major dip in asset prices is likely. Further, I think that inflation will become a problem, which would cause treasuries and other government bonds to drop. Government bonds are the last bubble to burst. Other asset prices will bottom when this bubble deflates. This force will reverse all the air that governments are putting in now. The global economy would have a second dip then.
The debate over inflation or deflation has been raging on. The low bond yield suggests that the consensus is for deflation. In September 2006 at the IMF-World Bank annual meeting in Singapore I predicted a financial crisis in 2007, economic crisis in 2008, and stagflation beyond. The last prediction has not happened yet. What governments and central banks are doing have strengthened my conviction that stagflation will haunt the global economy for years to come.
Historically, the burst following a speculative boom is deflationary for two reasons. First, a speculative boom is investment biased. Hence, there is overcapacity during the burst, as the demand during the boom was exaggerated. Second, bankruptcies of banks and production businesses drive up unemployment, which decreases demand and pushes more businesses into bankruptcies. This vicious cycle prolongs price decline.
The current burst won’t lead to sustained deflation for two reasons. First, the speculation was centered on unproductive assets like property and financial product. Automobile and electronics are two global industries with considerable overcapacity. The automobile industry has had overcapacity for a long time. The problem was covered up by the credit bubble that exaggerated demand, as buyers were incentivized to change cars more frequently with zero down-and-zero interest rate financing. The deflationary pressure would end with the bankruptcy of one or two major producers. The deflation would last if governments prop up their auto companies with taxpayers’ money. At least the Obama government has shown unwillingness to do so.
The electronics industry is used to deflation. It is usually good deflation-rising productivity supporting declining price from that industry. What’s going on now is not good deflation. The drastic cuts of capital expenditure by global companies have caused a demand collapse for IT products. The pressure is causing the industry to cut back quickly. This industry is shrinking without government prodding. The bad deflation in this industry will end quickly with capacity reduction.
China’s manufacturing expansion is also a source of overcapacity. When the Asian Financial Crisis depressed demand one decade ago, I thought China’s overcapacity was deflationary, because manufacturers in other countries would have match Chinese prices. Now is different. Manufacturing prices are Chinese. Manufacturing value added has shrunk dramatically relative to the costs of raw materials. The manufacturing capacity in China is unlikely to sustain deflation. For example, three quarters of the cost for steel production are raw materials like iron ore and coking coal. The overcapacity in steel production can’t sustain price decline of steel product.
Second, the vicious cycle between bankruptcy, especially banks, and demand contraction is unlikely now. Governments and central banks are propping up virtually every bank in the world. They are lending to industries to keep them afloat. The current dynamic suggests that a bottom for the global economy would be reached soon. As mentioned above, I thought it would be the first half of 2009. Now, with a second a second dip forecast, it would be likely in 2010.
Despite demand weakness, inflation could emerge through commodity inflation and labor unions pushing wage increase, the same factors in the 1970s. Commodity inflation is already visible as investors who are frightened of monetary expansion seek safe haven. Oil is back above $50/barrel despite demand collapse because so much money has flowed into exchange traded funds that buy oil. As central banks keep printing money, more and more money will flow into commodities.
I always believe that labor union is mostly demand driven. During prosperity labor unions are weak as a rising tide lifts everyone’s living standard. When hard time hits, more people support union activism. During economic stagnation, especially stagflation, without union power, average workers will see declining living standard. The national strikes in France and other European countries are a harbinger for what could come.
I have argued above for a second dip in 2010 and stagflation beyond. I want to add some comments on the nature of bear market rallies. In a structural bear market that lasts for years stock markets can have big bounces from time to time. These bounces can be as big as 40% from bottom to top. Obviously, rallies of such size are mouthwatering. It is difficult for investors to stay on the side line. I am not against playing such bear rallies. But, one must remember that bear rallies are at best zero-sum games and often negative-sum games, i.e., making new lows after each bounce. One’s profit is someone else’s loss. Timing is everything in playing bear bounces. Getting in and out early are the basic principles. The most harmful behavior is chasing. After a rally of 30% has happened, it is very bad for your financial health to chase.
The last structural bear market happened in the 1970s and lasted for ten years. It is obviously difficult for investors to stay on the sideline for a decade. After all, how long does one live? This is why a structural bear market swallows more and more people through such rallies. The ones that jump in later tend to be more patient and probably smarter. The last ones that perish in a structural bear market may have IQ over 200. I am afraid that the current bear market won’t end until it brings down Warren Buffett. |